In, 1760 the peace of Ahmadnagar was broken by a Koli rising. One of the Koli chiefs, Hiraji Bomle, whose family had held estates and rank from the time of the Bahamani kings, died. Though Hiraji's son Javji held a post in the Peshwa's service, the Peshwa's manager at Junnar refused to give Javji his father's estates and rank. Javji, who is described as of slight figure, middle-sized and fair, bold, restless and of irregular habits, gave up the Peshwa's service, withdrew to the hills, and organized a series of gang robberies. Javji was ordered to leave the hills and join an expedition which was starting for service in the Konkan. He feared treachery and fled to Khandesh. His family were seized and troops were sent against him. Javji had a bitter enemy in Ramji Savant, an officer at Junnar, who persuaded the manager of Junnar, that Javji was a man of hopelessly bad character. Ramji seized a party of seven Kolis, among them a brother and a cousin, whom Javji had sent to get some tidings about his family. Ramji obtained from the Junnar manager an order for the execution of the seven Kolis and they were hurled down the Shivner rock. In revenge Javji killed Ramji Savant's brother who was living on a lonely part of the hills with a Gosavi who was performing incantations which were to make Savant wound-proof. Ramji asked for a body of troops that he might hunt Javji. The troops were supplied and Javji broke his band in small parties and spread them all over the country. To have any hope of success against an enemy who were heard of from all quarters at once, Ramji had to follow their tactics and spread his men far and wide in small detachments. The party which he commanded was surprised by Javji, and Ramji and a young son of his were slain. Ramji's eldest son was put in command of the force but him too Javji surprised and killed in Junnar. The Pune government now formally declared Javji an outlaw. He joined Raghunathrao and did him good service, capturing Sidgad, Bhairugad, Kotta and other Thana forts, Alang in Nasik, and Ratangad and Madangad in Ahmadnagar. Nana Fadnavis sent orders to Daji Kokata, who was then one of the leading Koli officers at Junnar to act against Javji, and warned him that if he failed to seize Javji he would be dismissed from the Peshwa's service. Soon after Daji and Javji happened to meet in the forests in the Ghod valley. Daji represented himself as Javji's friend. They sat talking together and went to a river near to bathe. While they were bathing, one of Javji's men opened Daji's bag and found in it an order signed by Nana Fadnavis for Javji's execution. On his return to camp this man told Javji what he had seen and Daji and his three sons had their throats cut during the night. After this the pursuit of Javji became hotter than ever. He asked help from Raghunathrao, but Raghunathrao's cause was now hopeless and he could do nothing. On the advice of his friend Dhondo Gopal, the Peshwa's governor at Nasik, Javji surrendered all his forts to Tukoji Holkar, and through Holkar's influence was pardoned and placed in military and police charge of a district or subha of sixty villages in Rajur with powers of life and death over Koli robbers and outlaws. Jayji continued in a position of honour till in 1789 he died from a wound inflicted by one of his own followers. [Mackintosh notices that of Javji's twelve wives one was a Shimpin and the other a Telin. Trans. Bom. Geog. Soc. I, 254.] He was succeeded by his son Hiraji Naik. During the latter years of his life Javji had taken part in quelling a serious rising among the Kolis which was headed by two Koli leaders, Kokata and Shilkunda. One measure taken by the government to prevent the Kolis joining in this rising was to make the headmen of the different villages enter into a chain security or jamin sankhli each becoming surety for the other's good behaviour and the deshmukh or the district head being security for all. After Javji was put in charge of the district these leaders remained quiet for more than four years. They again went out, were betrayed, and executed. In 1798, a fresh disturbance took place among the Kolis. The leaders of this outbreak were three Koli brothers Govindji, Manaji and Valoji Bhangre, popular men round whom a large body of followers quickly gathered. Govindji was soon taken and Manaji fled and died. Valoji was more successful. He led a gang of over a thousand men and with drums and flags raided into the Deccan and Konkan and caused widespread terror and misery. He was at last taken by Hiraji Naik, Javji Bomle's son, and was blown from the mouth of cannon at Rajur. After Valoji's death, his nephew Ramji, who was an abler and more daring leader even than Valoji succeeded in baffling all the efforts of the Government officers to seize him. As force seemed hopeless the Government offered Ramji a pardon and gave him an important police post in which he did excellent service. [Trans. Bom. Geog. Soc. I, 256-258.]

Reverting to the narrative again-when this struggle for power was going on between the uncle and the nephew, Nizam Ali on July 6, 1762 deposed his brother Salabat Jung and usurped the sole power in Hyderabad. The breach between the uncle and the nephew continued and when both of them were on their way to Karnatak to contain Hyder Ali, Raghunathrao in resentment returned to Pune. All efforts of the Peshwa Madhavrao failed to conciliate him. He demanded separate jahagir in the State. The tension between the two parties grew and Raghunathrao alarmed of seizure by Madhavrao went to Wadgaon. The Peshwa followed him imploring him to return. But Raghunathrao suddenly decamped and by way of Koregaon and Ahmadnagar reached Vinchur where his partisans met him. The support of the Nizam, Nizam Ali and Janoji Bhosle was also secured. Armed conflict seemed inevitable. The Peshwa, however, suffered a reverse. Unwilling, however, to protract the civil strife, the Peshwa surrendered to his uncle and a reconciliation was brought between the two at the intercession of Malharrao Holkar. For the help rendered to him by the Nizam, Nizam Ali, Raghunathrao agreed to restore the rest of the districts which had been ceded by him under the treaty of Udgir in 1760. A treaty to this effect was concluded at Pedgaon. No sooner the agreement was effected than the Nizam formed an alliance with Janoji Bhosle and sent his arrogant demands to the Peshwa calling upon him to deliver all the territory and forts lying east of the Bhima, restore the jagirs of those who had been deprived of them in the recent conflict with Raghunathrao and accept his own nominee as his Diwan and be guided by his advice in the conduct of the Maratha State. The wrath of the Nizam was perhaps due to the non-fulfilment of the terms of the treaty entered into with Raghunathrao. With the quarrels in the Peshwa's family settled amicably war was declared and initially both the sides plundered and devastated each other's territory. Vinayakdas, the nephew of the Nizam's Diwan Vithal Sunder ravaged the rich towns of Nasik, Sangamner and Junnar and the Nizam himself sacked Pune. When the Peshwa learnt of this attack, he moved homewards, seeking for an opportunity to attack the Nizam who was now retreating. Many of the Maratha noblemen who had gone over to the Nizam deserted him and joined the Peshwa. The position of the Nizam was now precarious. He crossed the Godavari leaving behind his main army at Rakshasbhuwan under the command of Vithal Sunder. The Marathas surprised the Nizam's army on 10th August, 1763 and inflicted a crushing defeat upon it. The Nizam was forced to come to terms with the Marathas and in the treaty which was concluded on 25th September, 1763, he surrendered to the Peshwa territory worth 82 lakhs, that is, all that had been already secured at Udgir four years ago but which Raghunathrao had given back at Uruti and Alegaon and thus confirmed the former cessions.

It is not necessary here to detail the conflict of the Marathas with Haider Ali nor that between the Nizam and Janoji Bhosle except the fact that the latter conflict brought the Marathas and the Nizam together into an understanding which lasted for well over 30 years. The Peshwa, however, had to face trouble at home from his uncle Raghunathrao who began to raise troops and make war-like preparations at Nasik. When all methods to conciliate Raghunathrao through negotiations failed, Madhavrao decided to meet his uncle and decide the dispute in person. When Madhavrao was at Rahuri, the emissary of Raghunathrao, Chinto Vithal, arrived to negotiate an understanding. The uncle and nephew met at Chander and thence proceeded to Anandvalli. Raghunathrao agreed to lead a retired life if his debt of 25 lakhs was settled and suitable maintenance was provided to him by Madhavrao. The latter agreed asking in return the delivery of the forts of Ahmadnagar, Ashirgad, Shivner and Satara then heid by Raghunathrao.

However, the agreement proved to be only temporary and Raghunathrao started his old game of intrigues against the Peshwa. The Peshwa now decided to put an end to Raghunathrao's pretensions once and for all and attacking him in the fort of Dhodap forced him to surrender. Raghunathrao was taken to Pune and kept in confinement. On 18th November 1772 Madhavrao died and was succeeded by his younger brother Narayanrao as Peshwa. Narayanrao was, however, murdered on 30th August 1773 at the machinations of Raghunathrao who now aspired for Peshwaship. Raghunathrao was declared Peshwa but his assumption of power was going to be short-lived as was proved by latter events. A council known as Barbhais was formed to oppose Raghunathrao and most of the Maratha chiefs pledged their allegiance to the council. A son was born to the wife of the late Peshwa Narayanrao and this factor added vigour to the efforts of the council to depose Raghunathrao. Raghunathrao was now on the run and in desperation sought the help of the English. But even the English could not rescue him from his predicament and in an over-all agreement entered into with the Marathas at Salbye on 17th May 1782, they agreed not to offer any support to Raghunathrao in money or otherwise. The English surrendered him over to Mahadji Shinde who persuaded Raghunathrao to live at Kopargaon on the banks of Godavari. Lost now was all his arrogance and he sought the blessings of his sister-in-law Gopikabai at Nasik. From there he returned to Kacheshwar in the vicinity of Kopargaon and there expired on 11th December 1783 at the age of 48. His wife Anandibai and two sons took up residence at Kopargaon where they were brought up under a strict guard. They remained at Kopargaon till 1792 when they were moved to Anandwalli close to the west of Nasik town.

The years that followed the treaty of Salbye were taken up by the confrontation first between Haider Ali and Marathas and then between Haider Ali's son Tipu and the Marathas. In 1790 the Marathas, the English and the Nizam formed a tripartite treaty to put down the menace of Tipu leading to the submission of the latter to the allies in 1792.

When these events were taking place trouble was gradually brewing between the Marathas and the Nizam on the question of the payment of chauth which had been imposed by Bajirao I upon the Nizam's dominions and which had accumulated considerably. The Maratha government headed by Nana Phadnavis now pressed this demand upon the Nizam. This demand was stoutly opposed by Mushir-ul-Mulk alias Gulam Sayyad Khan, the minister of the Nizam. All attempts to settle the dispute by negotiations failed. The Nizam started preparations for war. The death of Mahadji Shinde in 1794 added an edge to the confrontation between the two. The English decided to maintain a strictly neutral attitude in this dispute and advised the Nizam to settle it amicably. The advice, however, did not succeed in getting a favourable response from the Nizam. Nana Phadnavis realised the inevitability of an armed conflict with the Nizam and issued definite orders for the march of the Maratha chiefs from all sides. The prospect of sharing in the gains from a victory over the Nizam brought to his standard all the leading Maratha chiefs.

The armies of Shinde and Holkar were already on their way to the south from their bases in the north. Tukoji Holkar, Raghuji Bhosle and Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan all quickly assembled and the armies began their march in the direction of the Nizam's forces early in January 1795. Detachments from Govindrao Gaikwad, Raste, the chiefs of Malegaon and Vinchur, the Pratinidhi, the Pant Sachiv, the Maratha mankaris, Nimbalkar, Ghatge, Chavan, Dafle, Pawar, Thorat and Patankar, joined the army. Even many others of less note put in their share. This was perhaps the last time that the Maratha chiefs in so strong a number met under the authority of the Peshwa.

Nizam Ali was first in the field and slowly advanced from Bidar along the banks of the Manjra, towards the Maratha frontier. The Peshwa quitted Pune in January on his eastward march and the Maratha armies also started their journey to the east in the same month as stated above but by different routes for the convenience of forage. The advance of the Maratha armies towards the east was via the Ghod river, Mandavgan and on to Mirajgaon on the Sina. Kharda, 150 miles east of Pune, was the mid-way station between it and Bidar in the vicinity of which the two opposing armies pitched their camps. The Maratha army contained over 1,30,000 horse and foot besides 10,000 Pendharis. Of this force more than one half were either paid from the Peshwa's treasury or were troops of jahagirdars or estate-holders under his direct control. Though the greater part of his army was in north India and Malwa, Daulatrao Shinde's force was the largest and most efficient, including 25,000 men, of whom 10,000 were regular infantry under Perron De Boignes. Second-in-command, Raghuji Bhosle mustered 15,000 horse and foot, Tukoji Holkar had only 10,000, but of these 2,000 were regular under Dudrence, and most of the Pendharis were followers of Holkar. Parashuram Bhau had 7,000 men.

The Marathas performed their holi festival at the village of Dhanod on 5th March when the Nizam had halted on the river Khar about 4 miles west of Kharda. That day light skirmishes started between the advance parties of the two armies. Both had their spies in the opposite camps who reported full news of the plans and movements of each. Reports arrived in the Maratha camp purporting that the Nizam had with him a harem of 150 ladies besides 80 concubines carried on as many elephants, each elephant carrying two women in a closed hawdah. For a week the two armies stood facing each other. The Pendharis and some other horse were ordered ahead to plunder round the Nizam's camp and spoil their forage. The heavy baggage properly protected remained one march in the rear and the best of the horse with the regular infantry, supported by upwards of 150 pieces of cannon were sent forward to attack Nizam Ali, who with an army 1,10,000 strong, advanced towards Kharda in Jamkhed about fifty-five miles south-east of Ahmadnagar and descended the Mohori pass. One day a body of Peshwa's household troops under Babarav, the son of Haripant Phadke, while reconnoitring, attacked the Nizam's army when it was descending the pass. He was driven off with loss. On the same evening Nizam Ali sat in state and received presents and congratulations on his victory. The notorious Mushir-ul-mulk arranged a dance in which Nana Phadnavis, Daulatrao Shinde, Parashuram Bhau and others were presented in hideous garbs. Govindrao Kale, the Maratha ambassador, left the audience abruptly to mark his displeasure at the indignity.

For a long time now no person had been named as the accredited commander-in-chief of the Maratha army. Nana Phadnavis, therefore, consulted the chief officers and appointed Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan, commander-in-chief, in a special darbar held at Ratanpur on 6th March. At the same time Babarao Phadke was appointed as his immediate Quarter-Master General. The Maratha army had now mainly occupied the bank of the Sina river whereas the Nizam's troops were encamped with their front at Talsangi on the river Khar about four miles from Kharda. After some desultory skirmishes for two or three days the commandant of the Nizam's army happened to effect some manoeuvres by moving from Kharda to Parenda with a view to changing his front into a rear, a movement which excited the attention of some Maratha chiefs.

The Marathas now appeared in great force on their right. Nizam Ali thereupon halted his elephant, sent his baggage to the left, and directed Asad Ali Khan with the cavalry, supported by 17,000 regular infantry under Raymond, to attack the Marathas. Parashuram Bhau rode forward to reconnoitre, supported by Babarao Phadke and Kashirao, the son of Tukoji Holkar. He had advanced only a short distance when he was suddenly charged by a body of Pathans, under a Baluchi named Lal Khan, who cut down several men, and with his own hand, unhorsed and wounded Parashuram Bhau. His cousin Vithal Baba who was standing by him was killed outright. Haripant Patvardhan, the Bhau's eldest son, seeing his father fall, attacked the Baluchi and killed him on the spot. Inspite of the loss of their leader the Pathans, supported by Alif Khan, the son of the Nawab of Karnaul, and Salabat Khan, the son of Ismail Khan, Nawab of Ellichpur, pressed on till the advanced party of the Marathas gave way, and were driven back in such confusion that a large section of the army were panic-stricken and thousands fled. Even Babarao Phadke in charge of the Golden Streamer or Jari Patka, was turning to fly when he was stopped by Jivba Dada Bakhshi, who upbraiding him for cowardice, told him if he wanted to be safe he might get behind Shinde's troops. By this time the regular battalions on both sides had approached within musket-shot, and the Nizam's cavalry were advancing to the support of their infantry with apparent steadiness, when Raghuji Bhosle met them with a shower of rockets, and at the same moment they received the fire of thirty-five pieces of cannon which Perron had judiciously placed on a rising ground. This occurrence proved a signal for a general charge. Shinde's men made a vigorous advance and were followed by Holkar's. An artillery duel started between the two combatants but there was no general action. [P. R. C, Vol. TV Nos. 178 and 178A.] In a few minutes the Nizam's cavalry were routed. Still Raymond's infantry stood their ground and had even gained some advantage over Perron's battalions, when Raymond, by repeated and peremptory orders, was forced to follow Nizam Ali, who had already retreated toward Kharda. By the time the detached portions of the Nizam's army learned their leader's intention, the sun had set, and darkness increased their confusion. After nightfall shots continued to be exchanged in different directions and few men, except those of Raymond's half-disciplined battalions, could find their own division. At last the multitude, worn by fatigue and clamour, sunk to rest, or lay down to await by the return of day. In the stillness of night, a small patrol of Marathas in search of water came by chance to a rivulet where lay a party of the Nizam's army who, discovering that they were Marathas, fired on them. Raymond's sentries who were near also fired. Then the whole line, who lay with their muskets loaded started from their sleep, and fired an irregular volley. In their perplexed state this volley drove the Nizam's army into complete panic. Many of Raymond's sepoys, struck with the general fear, quitted their ranks and mingled in the confusion. At last the moon rose and Nizam Ali, in utter consternation, sought refuge within the small badly-placed fort of Kharda. Most of his troops fled plundering the baggage of their own army as they went. They were not allowed to carry off this ill-gotten spoil as Maratha Pendharis over-took them, and, without opposition, stripped the panic-struck fugitives of all their booty. Next morning the Marathas found the ground strewn with guns, stores, baggage, and the usual wreck of an army. Their surprise was still greater on perceiving Nizam Ali shut in Kharda and his army wasted to one-tenth of its former strength. No people are keener and prompter in seizing such an advantage than the Marathas. The joyful news flashed through the whole force; the furthest parties came swarming in to plunder the left-over of the Nizam's army. In a few hours the Nizam's army was hemmed in, and, next day batteries were opened from hills which commanded the fort as well as the army. The Marathas stopped the entire supply of food and water and directed artillery fire on the wall through the night. Some of the enemy's guns and articles were seized by Marathas. Nizam Ali endured this hopeless exposure for two days. On the morning of the 15th March he asked for and obtained a cessation of arms.

Nana Phadnavis, in reporting the affair to the Chhatrapati, thus describes the action:

"We tried our utmost to settle the dispute with the Nawab by negotiation, but his minister Main-ud-daula employed despicable ways and methods to encompass the utter destruction of the Maratha State, planning to capture Pune and plant there the Nawab's flag. He also employed assassins to effect murders in Pune who were arrested and documentary proof of their evil designs was secured. The Moghals openly talked of driving the Marathas out of their homeland. Main-ud-daula so poisoned the Nawab's mind that no peaceful settlement could be secured. We exercised the utmost patience and avoided any extreme action. But when news came that the Nawab with a well-equipped force was directly marching upon Pune, we were compelled to take up the challenge. We assembled our armies and ordered Shinde's regiments from the north. We advanced in the direction of Bidar and leaving the Shrimant some twenty miles behind prepared for an attack. The two armies closed with each other on the afternoon of 11th March. Guns, spears, swords and daggers were freely employed in a short but deadly combat. The Nawab sustained a defeat and retired, but we continued our fire even after nightfall. During the night our Pendharis entered the enemy's camp and secured some plunder. The Nawab took shelter within the walls of Kharda. Throughout the 12th also artillery action continued, when towards the evening of that day the Nawab sent us men asking for terms and requested that the fire should cease. We demanded the surrender of Main-ud-daula who himself came forth boldly and saved his master from the awkward situation, saying, 'Here I am ready to surrender, do what you like with me.' We decided to keep him in our confinement if he gave his word that he would do no harm to our State. He was then respectfully received and kept under proper custody. We thus stayed our hand against the advice of Shinde, Holkar and others, who with one voice urged the subjugation of the whole Nizami State. Negotiations were then commenced for settling the payment of past dues. Three crores on account of the chauth and two more for the expenses of the war was agreed to, to be paid in instalments extending over three years. The fort of Daulatabad was to be made over to us in addition. The territory of the Bhosles of Nagpur recently captured by the Nawab was to be restored together with its accumulated revenue. The papers will be ratified now within a week. Jivaji Ballal, the Bhosles, the Holkars, our huzurat all helped zealously towards this grand success, which has been achieved through Your Highness' blessings and under providential grace." [Ati.Pat. 313.]

The preliminary demand made by the Marathas was the surrender of the minister Mushir-ul-Mulk, that amends might be made for the insult offered to the Peshwa in threatening to seize Nana Phadnavis. [When discussions about the payment of arrears were going on between the Peshwa's envoy Govindrao Kale and Mushir-ul-Mulk, the envoy was told in public darbar that Nana Phadnavis must himself attend at the court of Haiderabad, in order to afford an explanation of the different items of their intricate claims. The envoy replied,' Nana Phadnavis is much engaged; how can he come?'' How can he come?' re-echoed Mushir-ul-Mulk,' I will soon show how he shall be brought to the presence.' This menace was considered a sufficient declaration and although negotiations continued to the last both parties prepared to decide their difference by the sword. While at a distance, the war was extremely popular to the Nizam's troops. The grand army under Nizam Ali's personal command was assembled at Bidar and the camp was full of bustle and life. Vaunting threats were in the mouths of the ill-appointed disorderly soldiery. Pune was to be pillaged and burnt; the dancing girls already sung the triumphs of their army; and even the prime minister declared in a public assembly that the Nizam's territory should now be freed from Maratha encroachments; that they should recover Bijapur and Khandesh, or they would never grant peace until they had despatched the Peshwa to Benares with a cloth about his loins and a pot of water in his hand, to mutter incantations on the banks of the Ganges.] They next exacted territorial cessions, stretching along the frontier from Paranda on the south to the Tapi on the north, including the fort of Daulatabad and the part of those districts conquered by Sadashivrao Bhau in 1760, which had been restored to Nizam Ali in 1761 and Rs. 3 crores were promised on account of arrears of revenue and war expenses. Besides this, by a separate agreement, in lieu of Raghuji Bhosle's claims for ghas-dana in the Gangthadi, Nizam Ali ceded territory yielding Rs. 3,18,000 a year. Nizam Ali likewise promised to pay arrears due to Raghuji Bhosle amounting to Rs. 29 lakhs and to collect their respective shares of revenue in Berar, according to ancient usage, for all which the Peshwa afterwards became Raghuji's guarantee. Nizam Ali was extremely unwilling to surrender his minister. Mushir-ul-Mulk urged him to accept, as he thought the other conditions more moderate than might have been expected. The minister was delivered to a party of 200 Marathas by whom he was escorted to their camp. The Peshwa met him at the outskirts, and received him with distinction, but his person was carefully guarded. The Maratha delight at their triumph knew no bounds. A grievous sign of decay, said the young Peshwa, that Marathas should boast of a victory won without danger and without honour. In the battle both sides together scarcely lost 200 men, though a considerable number of Nizam's troops were killed during the night of panic and the two days' exposure to the Maratha fire. For long, to have been present at the glorious field of Kharda, was one of the proudest boasts of old Maratha horsemen. [Grant Duff's Marathas, 514-517.]

Some interesting details of the negotiations that took place after the action of the 11th March have been recorded by Govindrao Kale and deserve to be reproduced in substance. [The records of this Kale are huge, partly printed in Raj. Vols. 5, 7, 22 and in Itihas Sangraha, Vol. 5 deals with 1795, June to October.] As soon as Nizam Ali entered the walls of Kharda he called Kale to his side and said, " Give me two months' time and I will remove Azim-ul-Umrah from his post.". Kale declined to entertain this proposal, adding " you are the master, do what you like.". Govindrao returned to his tent and prepared to quit the Moghal camp. Nizam Ali, learning of this, at once despatched Ghasi Miya and called Kale again to his side. This was a game to gain time for obtaining a personal interview with the Peshwa in order to arrange a reconciliation between Nana and Mushir-ul-Mulk. Govindrao replied, " I am a mere servant, a well-wisher of both the States. I will faithfully convey your message to my master and his reply back to you. But let me humbly remind you that unless you actually remove your minister from office, no proposal will be entertained. ". As Govindrao stepped out to the door, three of Nizam's officers accosted him. Govindrao told them that he was going to communicate the Nawab's message to Nana. " If he does not agree, I will no longer return to this camp. I am now going away finally.". This was communicated to Aristujah, who immediately wrote to his master, " You must without the least hesitation accept the Peshwa's demand. Hand me over, and settle the trouble. Otherwise your State will suffer.". Upon this Nizam Ali invited the minister to his private apartment in the Zanan Khana. Main-ud-Daula told him, " You keep me confined at Ousa and find your way.".

The Nizam consoled him by saying, " Be perfectly at ease. I have my own plans about you. Let me see how I can manage them.".

In the meantime Govindrao returned with a reply from Nana to say, "Unless you remove the minister, the Peshwa will not receive your visit. We have no desire to continue the fight but if you do, we are ready with our reply.". Nizam Ali then called in Sharf-ud-Daula and asked his advice. Sharf-ud-Daula then wrote to Parashuram Bhau and others whom he knew well. They all replied that, " Until the minister was in the Maratha camp, no talk of any kind would be entertained." Thus Nizam Ali and his advisers realized that no other way was left and they yielded to the demand. On 27th March full fifteen days after the battle, Mushir-ul-Mulk came into the Maratha camp escorted by Kale and Rangopant Godbole. Nana Phadnavis proceeded some eight miles in advance to receive him. They met and conversed together freely. Then the minister was brought to interview the Peshwa. The Peshwa came out and received him at the gate. Daula descended from his elephant and Govindrao brought him to the Peshwa's presence, with his hands tied with a kerchief. The Peshwa descended from his elephant, and touched the minister's hand in compliment. Thereupon all the three, the Peshwa, Daula and Nana mounted an elephant and arrived at the large darbar tent. Here the guest was received with full honours. He had hung down his head all along. After the ceremony was over, Daula was taken to the quarters specially prepared for him and lodged there in the charge of Bajaba Shirolkar. " The Peshwa's stars are in the ascendant", remarks the chronicler. " This is how grand things beyond one's conception take place." " The Peshwa immediately started for Pune which he reached on Friday 1st May 1795 when he received a grand ovation and an unprecedented welcome from the Maratha capital. He marched in procession through the brilliantly-illuminated city when gold flowers were showered upon him. Mushir-ul-Mulk was lodged in the house of the Treasury well. Nana Phadnavis' highest desire came thus to be fulfilled." The Hyderabad minister remained in confinement just for a year. The Peshwa died the same year in October; further changes came about and Mushir-ul-Mulk was set free on 5th June 1796.

The death of Nana Phadnavis in March 1800 and a few others of the Maratha State shortly before or after marked a distinct change in the fortunes of Maratha State. Now the reins of the Government were left in the hands of two inexperienced youths. Bajirao and Daulatrao Shinde were no match for the scheming succession of British administrators, viz., the Wellesley brothers, Metcalfe, Kirkpa-trick, Close, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Jenkins, Munro and others. Bajirao was ill-advised not to join the British in their war against Tipu Sultan in which the former easily overcame the latter. Then came the menace of Dhondi Wagh, a descendant of the old Pawar family whom the British commanded by Arthur Wellesley defeated in co-operation with the Patwardhans within the territorial limits of the Maratha State. This event gave the British an excellent insight into Maratha character, their government, their leaders, the calibre and methods of their troops etc. which was to stand them in good stead in the years to come. Bajirao was now straining under the restrictions imposed upon him by Shinde and he informed the British resident Palmer of the situation.

This was communicated by him to the governor-general who ordered Wellesley to remain stand by with his forces to march to Pune if Bajirao was imprisoned by Shinde or if he ran away from Pune. This eventuality of course did not arise. It was at this time that Yeshwantrao Holkar, one of the illegitimate sons of Tukoji Holkar, came into prominence. He took up cudgels with Daulatrao Shinde to carry forward the traditional enmity between the two families. His brother Vithoji also collected the refractory elements who had suffered at the hands of Bajirao and Daulatrao and plundered practically the entire territory of Maharashtra between Khandesh and the Krishna. However, Vithoji Holkar was ultimately captured and brought before the Peshwa who ordered him to be trampled under the feet of an elephant. Daulatrao initially succeeded in defeating Yeshwantrao Holkar in the north but ultimately victory was declared for Yeshwantrao. Yeshwantrao now took up his residence in Khandesh and corresponded with Bajirao for obtaining satisfaction of his grievances. Bajirao played for time and thus lost a splendid opportunity for conciliating Yeshwantrao. Yeshwantrao was already enraged with Bajirao for the murder of his half-brother Vithoji and determined to exact retribution, he descended upon Ahmadnagar now a possession of Shinde, with the greatest fury. He plundered the city and the fort and proceeding further dug up and burnt Shinde's palaces at Shrigonda and Jambgaon. The glorious edifices erected by Mahadji Shinde and his chiefs were razed to the ground. Bajirao now tried to conciliate Holkar but was prevented from this action by Shinde whose forces were fast approaching in pursuit of Holkar. In the meanwhile Peshwa''s forces under Purandare were defeated by Holkar at Baramati. Bajirao sent frantic messages to Shinde for sending succour. Shinde sent his general Bakhshi Sadashiv Bhaskar with whatever forces he could command. He reached Paithan at the end of August and Ahmadnagar on 8th September 1802. He arrived at the capital on 22nd October. Yeshwantrao, on receipt of this news, sent a warning to the Peshwa stating that he had no desire to harm the Peshwa and urged for immediate negotiation between him, the Peshwa and Shinde. But his appeal fell on deaf ears. The fateful day arrived. On 25th October the armies of Shinde and Holkar locked themselves in a grim battle at Hadapsar which lasted for the whole day resulting in the complete rout of the former. Bajirao fled from Pune to Bassein and there remained practically under British protection. On 31st December 1802 he concluded the celebrated treaty of Bassein with the British under the terms of which in return for cessions of territory the British government bound itself to defend the Peshwa from all attacks. In the meanwhile, Holkar declared for Amritrao, the brother of Bajirao, for Peshwaship and tried his best to organise a Maratha confederacy for an eventual war with the British. His efforts proved futile and when the British informed him of their intentions to instal Bajirao at Pune, he left Pune on 13th March 1803. Bajirao was now escorted by Colonel Close to Pune on the 13th May 1803 and installed as Peshwa on the same day.

The position of Bajirao was far from happy and secure and he could not keep on friendly terms either with his British protectors or the Maratha confederates. He began to play a game of duplicity by intriguing against the British who were now bent upon reducing the power of the Holkar, Shinde, Bhosle and the rest of the Maratha confederates. The first clash of the British was with Shinde, when accounts reached the British government that Daulatrao Shinde had combined with Raghuji Bhosle to make war on the British. [The contracting parties to the treaty of Bassein had a full right to enter into the treaty which was purely defensive. It contained an express stipulation that the British troops should not be employed to attack the great Maratha jagirdars unless they should first commit hostilities against the allies. Daulatrao Shinde had called upon the British government to give assistance to the Peshwa to recover his throne subsequently when informed that the relations between the British and the Peshwa had been improved he had expressed his satisfaction at that event, and in his camp on the 2nd March had formerly declared to the British Resident that he had no intention of obstructing the treaty of Bassein or of committing hostilities against the British government or its allies. Wellington's Despatches, 1,291.] The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Daulatrao Shinde on the 27th of May and he was called on to state his objections if he had any. He was also desired to make known the object of his negotiations with Raghuji Bhosle and other Maratha chiefs, and if his designs were not hostile to the British government or its allies, he was called on to retire with his troops to their usual stations. Daulatrao Shinde, in answer, declared to the British Resident that until he had a meeting with Raghuji Bhosle he could not decide whether there should be peace or war, but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with the determination of the united chiefs as soon as they met. On the 3rd of June, Shinde and Raghuji Bhosle met at Bodwad near Malkapur and from that day, though they were shown that the treaty of Bassein was purely defensive, they evaded giving any answer till the 8th of July 1803. Both Shinde and Raghuji Bhosle then declared that they had no intentions to attack the British or their allies or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, provided the British would not prevent the execution of the treaties subsisting between the Peshwa and themselves. At the same time they continued to advance towards the Nizam's frontier. On the 14th of July General Wellesley, who was in command of the British forces and in charge of the negotiations, told Shinde by letter that unless he separated his troops from those of Raghuji Bhosle and both retired from the Nizam's borders, he could not consider their actions consistent with their declaration; when the united chiefs retired he promised that the British troops would also retire to their usual stations. If Shinde and Raghuji Bhosle kept their troops close to the Nizam's frontier, the British troops would attack Ahmadnagar. Shinde admitted the justice of General Wellesley's demand that their troops should retire. But instead of retiring they kept to their position on the Nizam's frontier and wrote to General Wellesley advising him to withdraw to Madras, Sheringapatan or Bombay. [Wellington's Despatches, I, 291.] Thus when General Wellesley had supposedly offered an equal and honourable peace, the Maratha chiefs for obvious reasons preferred war. [Wellington's Despatches, I, 291-92.] When these events were taking place, Yeshwantrao Holkar carried depredation in Aurangabad district. His joining the forces of Shinde and Bhosle would have strengthened the confederacy against the British but Daulatrao refused to conciliate Holkar who in disgust marched straight to Malwa. The gulf between the two was widened when a letter written by Daulatrao to Bajirao asking the latter not to worry over Yeshwantrao fell into the hands of Yeshwantrao. General Wellesley had thus to face one antagonist less in the war with the Marathas.

General Wellesley was stationed at Valki six miles south of Ahmadnagar. [The forces under the immediate command of Major-General Wellesley consisted of Cavalry H. M. 19th Light Dragoons, 384; 4th, 5th and 7th Regiments native cavalry 1347, total 1731; artillery 173; infantry, H. M. 74th and 78th Regiments, 1368; 1st battalion 2nd Regiment native infantry, 1st and 2nd battalions 3rd regiment native infantry, 1st battalion 8th regiment native infantry, 2nd battalion 12th regiment native infantry, and 2nd battalion 18th regiment native infantry; 5631; total 6999; grand total 8903. Besides these there were European artillery-men and 653 pioneers of the establishment of Fort, St. George, 2400 cavalry belonging to the Raja of Maisur and about 3,000 Maratha horse. Two battalions of sepoys were detached in July with a large convoy of treasure, bullocks, and grain from the army under the command of Lieutenant-General Stuart to the division under Major-General Wellesley. Wellington's Despatches, I, 293.] It was his intention to seize Ahmadnagar so soon as he heard that Shinde and Raghuji Bhosle refused to withdraw from the Nizam's border. A very heavy fall of rain defeated his plans. News that the chiefs refused to retire reached him on the 3rd of August. But from the third to the sixth such constant rain fell that the six miles between Valki and Ahmadnagar were impassable. On the 7th of August General Wellesley issued a proclamation declaring that he would make no war on the people and that all officers and others were required to remain in their stations and obey the orders they should receive; that if they did no harm to the British armies, no harm would be done to them: and that any one who either left his dwelling or did any harm to the British army or to their followers, would be treated as enemy.

On the seventh the country was still impassable, but the weather cleared and General Wellesley reached Ahmadnagar on the eighth. His intention was obviously to destroy Shinde's armed power concentrated between his two strong posts of Burhanpur and Ahmadnagar. The latter was well stocked with munitions, arms and supplies and strongly defended by Shinde's men. It, therefore, naturally claimed Wellesley's first attention. On the morning of the eighth General Wellesley sent a messenger to the commandant or killedar of Ahmadnagar requiring him to surrender the fort. On arriving near the town or petta he offered terms or kaul to the people. As the town was held by Arabs, supported by a battalion of Shinde's regular infantry and a body of horse encamped in an open space between the town and the fort, the terms were refused. General Wellesley immediately attacked the town in three places, in one place with the piquets of the infantry reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th Regiment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, in a second with the 74th Regiment and the 1st battalion of the 8th under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace and in a third with the flank companies of the 74th and the 1st battalion of the 3rd Regiment under the command of Captain Vesey. The town wall was very lofty and was defended by towers. It had also no rampart, so that when the troops had climbed to the top they had no ground to stand on, and the Arabs who held the towers defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy. At length they were forced to quit the wall and fled to the houses, from which they continued to pour a destructive fire on the troops. Shinde's regular infantry also attacked the British troops after they entered the town. Still in a short time, after a brisk and gallant contest, the British were completely masters of the town with the loss of four officers. From the nature of the contest the enemy's loss was much greater. On the 8th all the enemy's force which was not required for the defence of the fort, including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the town went north except a small number who attended one of their wounded chiefs who could not be moved from the fort. On the 9th General Wellesley reconnoitred the ground near the fort, and on that evening Colonel Wallace with five companies of the 74th Regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 12th Regiment, seized a position within 400 yards of the wall. On this spot in the course of the night, a four-gun battery was built to take off the defences from the side on which General Wellesley proposed to attack. The battery opened at daylight on the 10th. It was so well placed and fired with such effect that the commandant desired General Wellesley to cease firing that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. In reply General Wellesley told the commandant that he would not cease firing till either he had taken the fort or the commandant had surrendered it; still that he would listen to whatever the commandant wished to say. On the morning of the 11th the commander sent two agents to propose to surrender the fort on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison and his private property. General Wellesley agreed to this proposal, but it was five in the evening before the hostages arrived in the camp without whose presence, General Wellesley refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, the commandant marched out of the fort on the morning of the 12th with a garrison of 400 men, and the troops under General Wellesley's command took possession. The British loss since the 8th was trifling which General Wellesley attributed much to the spirit with which the British attacks on that day were made. [The losses were: of Europeans, the 19th Light Dragoons, Artillery, and H. M. 74th and 78th Regiments, killed 2 Captains, 2 subalterns, 1 sergeant, 1 drummer and 12 rank and file; wounded 2 subalterns, 1 sergeant, and 58 rank and file. Of natives, 5th Regiment Cavalry, 1st battalion 2nd Regiment, 1st battalion 3rd Regiment, 1st battalion 8th Regiment, 2nd battalion 12th Regiment, 2nd battalion 8th Regiment, and 1st battalion Pioneers, killed, 1 havildar, 1 naik, and ten sepoys wounded 1 subhedar, 9 havildars, 3 naiks, and 39 sepoys. Wellington's Despatches, I, 302.] Among the officers mentioned in General Wellesley's despatches were Lietutenant-Colonels Harness Wallace and Maxwell who commanded in the trenches, Captain Beauman commanding the artillery, Captain Johnson the engineer, and Captain Heitland of the Pioneers in the short subsequent siege. The fort of Ahmadnagar held an important position on the Nizam's frontier, covering Pune, and was a valuable point of support to all future operations of the British to the north. It was considered one of the strongest forts in the country and except Vellore in the Madras-Karnatak was the strongest country fort General Wellesley had seen. It was in excellent repair, except in the part exposed to the British artillery. Inside, it was in a sad dirty state and in the utmost confusion. The quantities of stores were astonishing and the powder was so good that General Wellesley replaced from the magazines that which he had consumed in the siege. General Wellesley thought the fort ought to be cleared of the old buildings with which it was crowded. [ Wellington's Despatches, I, 310.] General Wellesley proposed at once to cross the Godavari and intended to secure for the use of the British troops the resources of Shinde's possessions south of the Godavari depending on Ahmadnagar. [Wellington's Despatches, I, 299-301.]

General Wellesley appointed Captain Graham to take charge, for the use of the British government and the Peshwa, of all the territories belonging to Daulatrao Shinde depending upon the Ahmadnagar fort, and he called on all officials and others to attend to and obey Captain Graham's orders and those of no other persons. [General Wellesley's instructions to Captain Graham were: To keep the country quiet, to secure its resources and a free communication through it to Poona and Bombay. These were objects of far greater importance than to collect large revenue. Captain Graham was to refrain from pressing the country with a view to raising the collections. Wellington's Despatches, I, 303, 307]

General Wellesley then crossed the Godavari and the war was brought to a close by the great victory of Assaye on the 23rd of September. By the treaty concluded with Shinde by General Wellesley, on the 30th of December 1803, known as the treaty of Surji-Anjangaon the territories near Ahmadnagar, the ancient family-lands of Shinde were restored to him, under a particular stipulation that no armed men were ever to be kept in them. [Wellington's Despatches, I, 569.] General Wellesley also considered it necessary to do away with the possibility of any future Maratha build-up and decided to remove Amritrao to Benaras as he was likely to be the rallying point of a general national rising. He was at first accommodated with his family in the fort of Ahmadnagar both as a place of safety against possible harm from his vengeful brother Bajirao and at the same time for watching his activities towards reviving the Maratha power. The fort of Ahmadnagar together with the district taken possession of at the time of the capture of the fort remained with the British by whom they were soon after given to the Peshwa. [Wellington's Despatches, I, 412.] At this time two free-booters, Malva Dada and Syed Sultan Ali, are mentioned as committing great depredations. Malva Dada took Shrigonda and defeated Captain Graham's peons sent against him [Wellington's Despatches, III, 356, 423, 466 and I, 464.] and it was a condition in Shinde's treaty that he should cause Malva Dada to withdraw with the banditti that were breaking daily from the district across the Godavari into Khandesh. Syed Ali was tried and found guilty and was sentenced accordingly. [Wellington's Despatches, III, 556.] The war against Holkar still continued and his districts in the Deccan were taken by the English. In 1805 he came to terms when his Deccan possessions were restored to him except Shevgaon which also was given up within two years. The elimination of the alliance against the English and the signing of separate treaties with the three principal Maratha chiefs ended all semblance of Peshwa's control over them. He became one like them. His jurisdiction extended to Khandesh in the north and the river Tungabhadra in the south.

Famine, 1803-04: In 1804 to add to the miseries of the country which had been ravaged by Holkar's troops in 1802 the late rains of 1803 failed and a fearful famine followed. Whole districts were de-populated and the survivors sought refuge in the forts built in the larger villages. At Ahmadnagar more than 5,000 persons were employed by General Wellesley in making a glacis or bank round the fort. In his march from Ahmadnagar to the Godavari (24th August 1803) General Wellesley trembled for the want of the common country grains for the followers and cattle. The country was completely exhausted and the villages empty and large tracts of rich land waste. [Wellington's Despatches, I, 335.] The Bhils and other wild tribes taking advantages of the confusion gathered in large bands and completed the ruin of the land. They pillaged and murdered without mercy and no mercy was shown them in return. It was through these hills that marauders penetrated, pillaged the rich plain villages and escaped. The hills were almost inaccessible to detachments of regular troops. Against such an enemy no weapons were thought too cruel or too base. The Pendharis also began to make inroads into the district. To put down the Bhil rising Bajirao invested Balaji Lakshman, the Sarsubhedar or governor of Khandesh with full powers. At the instigation of Manohargir Gosavi, one of his captains, Balaji Lakshman invited a large body of Bhils to a meeting at Kopargaon on the Godavari, treacherously seized them, and threw them down wells. This restored order for a time. But in 1806 disorder was as general as ever and Trimbakji Dengle who was then in charge of the district caused another massacre of Bhils at Ghevri-Chandgaon in Shevgaon. He commissioned Naroba Patil of Karambha to clear the Gangthadi and 5,000 to 6,000 horse and a large body of infantry were given him. Naroba butchered the Bhils and all who had any connection with them wherever he found them. During fifteen months 15,000 human beings are said to have been massacred.

After the transfer of Ahmadnagar to the Peshwa the land revenue was farmed to the highest bidder. The farmer had not only the right to collect the revenue, but to administer civil and criminal justice, and so long as he paid the required sum and bribed the court favourites no complaints were listened to. Justice was openly sold and the mamlatdar of a district was often a worse enemy to the husbandmen than the Bhils.

In the meanwhile the last great Maratha alliance against the English was completed. The events leading to it were as under: When the treaty of Bassein was concluded Bajirao virtually surrendered his right to control the Maratha chiefs to the English. Bajirao, at the time, had not understood the implication of this. As soon as he returned to Pune he expected the English to support him in his bid to exercise his authority over the Maratha chiefs. The English indirectly made separate treaties with Bhosle, Shinde, Holkar and Gaikwad and made the position very clear in the award signed at Pandharpur on 19th July 1892. Bajirao now considered it necessary to have a disciplined corps of infantry. The Governor-General granted the permission and a force was raised under Major Ford. The troubles with the English had not stopped and Bajirao expecting a war sooner or later started preparation by augmenting his forces. A dispute arose between Bajirao and Gaikwad of Baroda in regard to the payment of yearly tribute which had accumulated. Fatesinh Gaikwad sent his agent Gangadhar Shastri to Pune to conclude a settlement with Bajirao. The Shastri arrived in Pune in January 1814. Soon, however, the Shastri found that Bajirao was bent upon extracting money rather than arriving at a settlement. The event culminated in the murder of Shastri at Pandharpur on July 20, 1815. The author of the plot was Trimbakji Dengle, a henchman and adviser of Bajirao. The English forced Bajirao to surrender the rebel. Trimbakji had been confined in the fort at Thana from where he made good his escape on the evening of September 12, 1816. He rode through jungle to north Khandesh and lived for some months with the wild tribes of the region and also wandered about the hilly country of Sangamner, rousing the wild tribes. Bajirao covertly supported Trimbakji and it appeared that hostilities would again start between the English and the Marathas. In June 1817, the English imposed another treaty on Bajirao with stricter terms, thus depriving him of all power and authority. Under the terms of the treaty known as the treaty of Pune the Peshwa ceded the fort of Ahmadnagar to the English. [Grant Duff's Marathas, 635.] This treaty also declared Trimbakji to be the murderer of Shastri, finally extinguished the Peshwa's overlord-ship over the Indian Chiefs, ceded to the English all the Peshwa's territory outside Maharashtra, compelled him to withdraw all his wakils from foreign courts and prevented him from any longer keeping correspondence or communication with them. Thus the Great Maratha confederacy came to be finally and publicly dissolved. Bajirao had signed the treaty of June 1817 under severe duress and had nursed in his heart a bitter sense of wrong. He now secretly incited several Indian powers for an anti-British rise. He also selected strong and useful recruits and commanded his general Bapu Gokhale to create an efficient army by keeping at his disposal a crore of rupees. Elphinstone viewed the situation as serious and called for reinforcement from Sirut. In the meanwhile the Maratha forces attacked the English camp at Kirkee but suffered a serious reverse (5th November 1817). Pune fell to the British and Bajirao now became a fugitive. He fled (17th November) past Junnar to Otur and then to Brahmanvada about ten miles north in the Akola sub-division up the Lal pass, and thence to Lingdev about nine miles. Between these three places he spent the time from the 17th to the 27th of December. As the eastern passes were difficult for guns General Smith who had arrived at Sirur on the 17th of December moved to the Nimbedehera pass. He left Sirur on the 22nd and on the 25th reached Hanvantgaon nearly on the direct road from Ahmadnagar to Kopargaon. From Hanvantgaon he made a long march to Sangamner and on the 27th he marched further west to Thugaon. The Peshwa sent his tents to the Vasir pass on the 27th as if he intended to cross the valley of the Pravara near Akola and proceed by the great road to Nasik, but on hearing of General Smith's approach to Sangamner he changed his route and moved to Kotul on the more western side through Rajur. When General Smith reached Thugaon the Peshwa, thinking that he could not pass to the north without the risk of being entangled in the hills and over-taken by the British troops, retraced his steps on the 28th and arrived on the same day at Otur, a distance of nearly twenty miles through hills from whence he proceeded southwards. He was camping at Ashta when he was over-taken by the English troops. The Marathas suffered a total reverse in the battle fought on 20th March 1818. Bajirao marched by Nevasa to Kopargaon, and proceeded north towards Chandor in Nasik. But the approach of Sir Thomas Hislop drove him back to Kopargaon whence he fled north-east towards Dholkot near Ashirgad where he finally surrendered on the 3rd of June 1818. Meantime Holkar and the Pendharis had been defeated, and by the treaty of Mandeshvar in January 1818, Holkar surrendered to the English all his possessions south of the Satpudas including Shevgaon. The forts of Harishchandragad and Hunjilgad were taken possession of between the 4th and the 8th May 1818 by a detachment under Captain Sykes despatched by Major Eldridge from Chavand [Pendhari and Maratha Wars, 274.] in Pune.

On the 27th of April 1818 a body of horse entered Nevasa and excited considerable alarm. Within three days they were dispersed and returned to their villages. Dharmaji Prataprao committed great depredations and cruelties in Shevgaon. [Pendhari and Maratha Wars, 273.] Before General Smith's arrival a detachment, commanded by Major Macleod of the Auxiliary Horse, had marched from Ahmadnagar at the requisition of Captain Pottinger against Dharmaji Prataprao, the only individual who remained in arms on the south side of the Godavari. The insurgent dispersed his banditti, and disappeared; but General Smith sent out a sufficient reinforcement to Major Macleod, to enable him to reduce Dharmaji's forts and to cut off the means of renewing the rebellion. [Mr. Elphinstone, 24th May 1818 ; Pendhari and Maratha Wars, 343.] The whole of the dominions of the Peshwa and those of the Holkar in the Deccan were taken possession of by the British government. Shinde had held half of Shevgaon and the Shrigonda pargana. The greater part of the Korti pargana including the present sub-divisions of Karjat and part of Shrigonda was under Rao Rambha Nimbalkar till 1821 when it was given to the English. Ahmadnagar with the country between the Chandor hills and the Bhima was placed under Captain Pottinger. Little difficulty was found in restoring order. The country was exhausted, and the people willingly obeyed any power that could protect them. The Peshwa's disbanded soldiers settled in their villages, the hill-forts were dismantled, and their garrison gradually reduced. Near the Sahyadris the country was in the hands of the Koli Naiks. They and the Bhil Naiks were sent for, and allowances and villages which they already held were confirmed to them on the understanding that they should keep the neighbouring country quiet. Ahmadnagar very soon enjoyed more complete rest than it had known for years.